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In the early-1980s, it was clear to a number of U.S.
companies that Japanese semiconductor firms had a focus on
quality assurance that was driven by a set of management
practices that were neither as widely evident nor as intensively
practiced in the United States. The set of Japanese practices
that led to their ability to outperform U.S. companies included a
focus on a manufacturing as the locus of quality, defining
quality objectives in terms of manufacturing goals, and using a
"total quality" approach to quality assurance. U.S.
semiconductor firms, faced with a severe quality gap in the early
1980s, pursued a strategy of wholesale copying of the Japanese
total quality philosophy. By careful adaptation of successful
Japanese quality assurance practices to better fit with
traditional Western management culture, and with the help of
organizational innovations like SEMATECH, some U.S. semiconductor
firms were successful in catching up with their Japanese
competitors. The objective lessons from the strategy used by the
U.S. semiconductor firms are important for other U.S. industries
facing similar competitive challenges to understand.
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Introduction
U.S. industry has been under great pressure to respond to
intensifying global competition, especially from Japan. Almost
no industry has faced more intense Japanese competition than the
U.S. semiconductor industry. Beginning in the late 1970s,
Japanese firms steadily gained market share. But, unlike other
industries facing Japanese competition, in the past two years,
the U.S. semiconductor industry was able to arrest and then
reverse this trend. By 1992 the global market share of the
Integrated Circuit (IC) market held by U.S. firms nearly equaled
that of Japanese firms: 41 percent versus 43 percent.2
While there are many aspects of U.S.-Japan competition that
factor into the story behind the recovery of the U.S.
semiconductor industry, one important one that has received
almost no mention is the role of improved U.S. quality. Over the
past twenty five or so years, Japanese firms had demonstrated a
consistent ability to achieve superior levels of quality relative
to American firms. But a number of American semiconductor firms
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in the mid to late-1980s aggressively responded to the quality-
led strategic thrust of Japanese producers and significantly
narrowed the Japanese quality advantage. Closing the quality gap
in the 1980s was undoubtedly one critical element leading to the
recovery of the U.S. semiconductor industry's global competitive
position.
In order to judge the degree of U.S. quality improvement in
the 1980s, compare the rate of defective parts shipped for U.S.
and Japanese memory producers.3 In 1980, Japanese producers of
leading edge semiconductor memory devices, a bellwether device
family, were achieving an average rate of 160 defective Parts Per
Million (PPM) . 4 At the same time for the same devices, American
producers had an average rate of 780 PPM, or nearly five times
the Japanese average.5 By the late 1980s, Japanese memory
producers had reduced their defect rate to around 100 PPM.
American firms had also reduced their defect rate to the same
level.6 How did U.S. firms accomplish this feat in such a short
period of time?
The success of American firms such as Texas Instruments
(TI), Motorola, Intel and others, lay in their wholesale adoption
of many of the principles of quality assurance employed by their
Japanese competitors. But, while they adopted Japanese
principles, the American companies modified the Japanese
2
practices used to implement them. This permitted the U.S. firms
to more readily weave the Japanese principles into the management
fabric of a Western firm.
Quality in the Context of Japanese Semiconductor Firms' Strategy
From about the mid-1970s, Japanese semiconductor firms saw
superior quality as the strategic competitive tool to forge their
way into important segments of the U.S. semiconductor market.
Efforts to penetrate the U.S. market were focused on leading edge
U.S. customers, such as IBM and Hewlett Packard (H-P), where
quality weighed heavily in the purchase decision.7 By the early-
1980s, it had become clear to a number of these leading edge
customers that the Japanese semiconductor firms had a focus on
quality assurance that was driven by a philosophy and a set of
management practices that were neither as widely evident nor as
intensively practiced in the U.S. semiconductor industry.
There were both internal and external management components
to the Japanese approach. Both were important to sustaining
their ability to achieve higher quality levels than their U.S.
rivals.
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Internal Management Philosophy And Practices
The internal Japanese philosophy towards achieving high
levels of quality had three notable characteristics. None of
these characteristics were evident in the U.S. industry in the
late 1970s, early 1980s period. First, the quality assurance
strategy was developed around manufacturing capabilities. For
example, an article written in 1982 by a manager of Matsushita's
semiconductor operations stated: "It is said that 'inspection
does not improve quality. Good quality is produced in the
manufacturing process.'" 8 Defining quality in terms of the
effectiveness of their manufacturing operations meant that, for
Japanese managers, quality was more than simply something
achieved on the surface of the company; it was embedded into the
very core of the Japanese firm. This philosophy contrasted
sharply with the then dominant U.S. philosophy of investing
heavily in final test to sustain outgoing quality levels.
Second, the focus on manufacturing operations led Japanese
managers to define quality assurance goals in terms of
manufacturing-related objectives. To illustrate, take the
statement of a plant manager at NEC semiconductor's Yamagata
operation: "[Quality] means improving manufacturing yield and
reliability...In order to improve the quality of products and
operate the production system efficiently, zero breakdowns and
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zero defects must be the goal."9 This was a very typical view
throughout the Japanese industry.
Third, Japanese managers took a comprehensive view of the
factors that influenced quality in their manufacturing
operations. Quality involved every aspect of the organization
from management decision-making down to, and including, training
of line operators. A report on improving quality prepared by the
management of Fujitsu's semiconductor operations expresses this
view:
The approach for 'zero defect' and 'securing yield
absolutely' begins with thorough facility management...In
order to use facilities in stable condition, enforcement of
cleaning of facilities, inspection, strengthening of
maintenance staff in new phases is needed, which is
producing good results. Needless to say, united activities
of development, facility and production sections are the
premise for 'zero defects'...1 °
These differences in the approach of Japanese semiconductor
manufacturers towards quality assurance -- a focus on
improvements in manufacturing productivity, stating quality
objectives in terms of manufacturing objectives, and adoption of
a broad definition for quality -- came together in the twin
concepts of "Total Quality Control" (TQC) and "Total Preventive
Maintenance" (TPM). These concepts originated in the U.S. and
surfaced in the 1970s in Japan. They began to be fully
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implemented in the early 1980s across a number of Japanese
semiconductor firms. An NEC presentation discusses the evolution
of these concepts in Japan:
Preventive maintenance started in America. Before 1950,
when breakdown maintenance was common, repair work was done
only after equipment failed to function. The concept of
performing Preventive Maintenance (PM) before such
breakdowns occurred took hold after 1950, and got a new
twist in Corrective Maintenance (CM), which sought to
correct problems before they caused a breakdown. Later,
Productive Maintenance came into being, and was performed to
maintain high productivity. In the 1960s, Maintenance
Prevention, applied during the planning stages, was
introduced, in which considerations for reliability,
maintainability, and cost efficiency were built into the
design.
In the 1970s, we entered the TPM age. This concept
incorporated American Productive Maintenance methods into
one suitable for Japanese corporate culture. The result is
one that respects human value and utilizes everyone's
participation for total efficiency...
The number of corporations which develop TPM as a part of
TQC has been increasing. Both TQC and TPM execute
maintenance and improvement of quality, and have the same
purpose of aiming at 'improvement of atmosphere of
corporations,' but TPM's mission to advocate the idea of
TQC, whose supremacy lies in quality, is more concrete and
creates an atmosphere which produces quality on the
production floor.l
Underpinning these broad approaches to quality management
were explicit management practices. For instance, by the mid-
1970s, the major Japanese semiconductor firms were applying
Statistical Process Control (SPC) methods -- techniques pioneered
at AT&T in the 1950s -- to control individual process steps in
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fabrication and assembly operations in order to reduce variance
and defects during production. Again the focus was
manufacturing. As Kaneyuki Kurokawa, currently a managing
director at Fujitsu semiconductor, explained, "In Japan, the
manufacturing group was the strongest member of any company, as
evidenced by the success of statistical process control in
manufacturing. ,,12
Management disciplines needed to effectively apply SPC
techniques were already well-embedded in Japanese management
culture. These included, for example, process engineers working
to incrementally refine process steps in a disciplined,
systematic way; rigorous correlation through customer feedback of
the occurrence of defects to specific process steps; and training
programs for operators to increase their understanding of
technical issues in fabrication and testing. In other words, in
the early 1980s, aspects of quality assurance that American firms
were just beginning to understand were already well-practiced
disciplines in Japanese firms.
Three illustrations, line operator training, design of line
automation, and equipment reliability, demonstrate how the twin
concepts of TQM and TPM were implemented.
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Training of Line Operators In the early 1980s, Japanese
managers, generally, exhibited a higher degree of confidence in
their line equipment operators than did their U.S.
counterparts.1 3 In Japanese-managed front-ends, equipment
operators were expected to perform a number of tasks that, in the
U.S., were left to engineering technicians who were more senior
and more highly educated. For example, in the Japanese system,
the responsibilities for making equipment assists and maintaining
equipment operating parameters are under the jurisdiction of
equipment operators. In the U.S., such responsiblities were
usually left to the more senior technicians. In order for line
operators in the Japanese firms to achieve this level of
proficiency, ,a well-trained, well-disciplined operator workforce
was essential. One focal point for implementation of TPM was at
the operator level, manifesting itself through a substantial and
continuing investment in ongoing operator training. As an NEC
presentation on TPM stated, "The greatest effect of TPM was in
the improvement of human factors...educating staff is most
important. ,,14
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Automation of Production Lines Total Preventive Maintenance
concepts influenced how Japanese firms defined objectives for
automating their production lines. Certainly, in the early
1980s, strong differences existed between American and Japanese
managers' views regarding the ultimate goals of automation.
American managers saw automation principally as a means to
achieve cost improvements.15 But this was not an explicit goal
of Japanese managers. Their general thrust differed from the
U.S. approach in that they set engineering goals and expected the
improvement in operating conditions to indirectly result in lower
unit costs. Japanese firms automated their front-ends for
reasons of quality assurance, for improved processing control,
better handling of materials, and more rapid data processing and
feedback. All were essential components of TQM.
Improvements in Equipment Reliability Japanese
semiconductor managers perceived a close relationship among TPM,
improvements in quality assurance, and requirements for greater
equipment reliability. An NEC report, for instance, discussing
this issue noted:
[W]e have to have a countermeasure regarding the elements
which control yield, especially for the problems surrounding
the equipment... The concept of TPM means activities to
decrease problems, losses due to deterioration, and
maintenance costs. This is achieved by fully checking
reliability [of equipment], ease of maintenance, economics
and safety based on maintenance information gathered through
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independent maintenance, individual improvement, and so
forth of existing equipments....We need to determine
objective values for each item of equipment for each
facility and plan in such a way that those values are
achieved during the design stage.16
In some sense, the push into TQM and TPM simply formalized
management practices already deeply ingrained in Japanese firms.
External Relationships
Strong external relationships with key vendors also
contributed to the ultimate success of the Japanese semiconductor
industry's drive to enhance quality. The nature of these
external relationships in Japan between vendor and customer must
be understood in the broader context of hierarchial relationships
in Japanese business. A vendor is considered to be an essential
extension of a manufacturer's capability to sustain and improve
quality. In the context of the general Japanese philosophy,
American semiconductor managers, in the early to mid-1980s, found
two characteristics of the external relationships especially
noteworthy. First, on the downstream side of the external
relations, there was extensive feedback of quality assurance data
from the systems level customers to the Japanese device makers
(and aggressive and thorough study of the data by the device
makers to resolve problems)."17 Second, on the upstream side,
between Japanese device producers and their equipment and
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material vendors, there existed a high degree of close coupling.
That is, there was degree of interaction involving the continuous
exchange of people and technical support. The degree of
interaction far exceeded that typically found between a U.S.
device company and its vendors at that time. s
Both the upstream and the downstream relationships enhanced
the quality assurance effort of the Japanese device makers.
Feedback Cycle Between Japanese Device Companies And Their
Customers Japanese device companies and their customers:
[E]stablish a feedback cycle treating the suppliers and
users as one body rather than have them in confronting
positions ... Therefore, [systems] manufacturers have the
[semiconductor] manufacturers produce perfect products
rather than having to eliminate defects when they carry out
inspections. Information concerning quality evaluation from
user's point of view is fed back to, and is made the best
of, by the part manufacturers.1 9
Close Couplinq Among Device Producer And Equipment And
Material Vendors With respect to equipment vendors, extremely
tight coupling meant, for example, that device firms routinely
called on their equipment vendors to provide technical support in
all phases of manufacturing, including even the most sensitive
stages of developing new production processes.20 Equipment
vendors were also expected to be primarily responsible for
11
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maintaining equipment uptime even after installation. The nature
of the relationship was one of constant measurement of the
vendor's performance. But, as one American observer noted,
"There is no premium for good performance, but a drop in
performance values may lead to punishment by order cancellation
if a trend develops.""21 Thus, while there was greater openness
and sharing with the vendor, the burden fell on the vendors to
sustain their performance levels.
The combined impact of an internal effort focused on
enhancing quality performance in high volume manufacturing
together with strong external vendor relationships yielded a
higher discernible level of quality in Japanese-supplied
semiconductor memory parts in the early 1980s. U.S. customers
could identify two significant differences between U.S. and
Japanese quality levels. The first difference, as noted above,
was that Japanese defect rates were four to five times lower than
U.S. rates. The second difference was that Japanese suppliers
were able to pass U.S. customers' qualification procedures more
rapidly than U.S. suppliers, with fewer iterations through the
qualification trials resulting from design or process
alternations. Shorter qualification time allowed Japanese
semiconductor producers to begin to define product standards for
leading-edge devices, in turn facilitating more rapid market
penetration.
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Reflecting these differences, Japanese producers steadily
increased their share of the world memory market until they
captured over 70 percent by 1988.22 At the same time, the
Japanese world market share for total ICs increased from twenty
five percent in the late 1970s to over forty five percent by the
mid-1980s.23 Clearly the Japanese quality-led strategy had been
successful.
Evolution of U.S. Semiconductor Managements' Quality Assurance
Strategies
The competitive wake-up call for the U.S. semiconductor
industry on its quality problems came in a very public way. In
1980, a senior H-P executive addressing a meeting convened in
Washington, DC by the Electronics Industries Association of Japan
presented data comparing U.S. and Japanese defect rates for
semiconductor memories (actually Dynamic Random Access Memories
or DRAMs) purchased by H-P. The H-P data demonstrated that, not
only were the Japanese memories consistently shipped with lower
defect rates, their average defect rates were, in fact, an entire
order of magnitude lower. For some in the audience the message
was not surprising. It had been increasingly understood for some
time throughout the U.S. electronics industry that Japan's
semiconductor producers were able to achieve significantly higher
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and more uniform product quality.
In the wake of the public H-P disclosure, many U.S. firms
started to reassess their approach to quality assurance. Even in
the early 1980s, most U.S. semiconductor firms were still relying
mostly upon inspection and verification methods to insure final
product quality. These methods had their origins two decades
earlier with U.S. Air Force procurement programs; at that time,
the Air Force was the largest procurer of U.S. semiconductors and
had a significant influence over the industry's quality assurance
practices. While the Air Force's methods were advanced in the
early 1960s, by 1980 they ranked as the less sophisticated. (See
Table 1 which defines, in ascending order of sophistication, the
four major stages of quality assurance.)
While the Air Force was influential in defining the first
two stages of quality assurance practices used in the
semiconductor industry, it was the Japanese producers who
ulimately defined the subsequent stages that became the norms for
the 1980s. In contrast to the Stage Two practices applied at
most American semiconductor firms at that time, Japanese
semiconductor producers were already basing their quality
assurance programs around the more advanced concept of prevention
-- Stage Three -- or were well into the transition towards Stage
Four or "Total Quality Management" (TQM). Given their use of
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more advanced quality assurance concepts, the fact that they were
able to achieve an order of magnitude of better quality was not
surprising.
The challenge facing U.S. semiconductor firms in 1981 was to
significantly improve their quality levels by moving to a Stage
Three philosophy of prevention. By the mid-1980s, a number of
U.S. semiconductor firms had made significant strides towards
instituting a prevention-based approach to quality assurance with
the adoption of SPC techniques. But even with this change, U.S.
defect rates continued to remain nearly an order of magnitude
greater than the Japanese. There was a two-fold reason why.
First, semiconductor technology had evolved towards sub-one
micron features, meaning that circuit designs were smaller and
devices were far more difficult to manufacture and test.
Prevention-based methods alone were not sufficient to address the
complex issues of maintaining quality in the sub-one micron era.
Second, Japanese firms were applying a more comprehensive,
sophisticated quality assurance philosophy.
As U.S. managers became increasingly aware that they were
unable to match the higher quality levels achieved by the
Japanese, they began to seek answers. Gradually, through various
windows on Japanese firms' practices such as joint ventures with
Japanese firms or their Japan-based subsidiaries, more and more
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U.S. managers came to understand that the Japanese firms were
operating under a very different quality assurance philosophy.
The obvious answer to the U.S. quality problem lay in adopting
the same philosophy.
But, in adopting it, U.S. managers realized that they could
not simply import on a wholesale basis the various means that
Japanese firms' used to implement their quality assurance
programs. One example indicates why. Contrast the difference in
how management objectives for improving quality were conveyed to
mid-level managers in the two industries.
In the U.S. case, in order to insure that quality assurance
was factored into a line manager's decision-making, it was
necessary to explicitly include quality objectives in the job
description and identify quality as a major component of a
manager's performance bonus. In Japanese firms, the same
objective was conveyed by less formal means. Frequent meetings
inside the firm and informal socializing outside it conveyed
management's intentions to everyone. Collectively, all managers
came to understand the need to give weight to these objectives
and to move toward achieving them. Further, Japanese managers
intuitively understood that high quality was essential for the
long-term survival of their company.2 4 Consequently, a Japanese
firm's process of creating a TQM culture was bound to be based on
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more informal measures than the comparable process in an American
firm.
The Catch-Up With Japan
In order assess the extent of the changes in the U.S.
industry practices, first, we will examine how these firms
reoriented their investments in quality. Results of a National
Institutes of Technology and Standards (NIST) survey of the U.S.
semiconductor industry's quality assurance investments in the
1980s provide this insight. Second, we examine more specifically
what actions were taken by various firms in the industry to
restructure their quality assurance efforts.
Magnitude of the Restructuring of the Quality Assurance
Effort
The NIST survey revealed that, between 1980 and 1990, the
surveyed semiconductor firms doubled their rate of spending
related to quality.25 (See Table 2.) In isolation, this means
little since it could simply indicate that these firms just
intensified their investment in Stage One or Stage Two activities
such as final test. That the increase reflected a more sweeping
change was indicated by survey respondents' answers to questions
which probed where the increased quality-related outlays were
made. The NIST survey asked for the relative quality-related
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spending across four budget categories: operations, overhead,
research and development (R&D) and capital investment.
Responding companies reported a substantial decline in the
portion of the operations and overhead budgets related to quality
(see Table 3); these declines were exactly what one would expect
as firms moved away from Stages One and Two towards Stages Three
and Four. These latter two stages diffuse quality assurance
responsibilities throughout the organization. As a result,
spending for overhead functions such as a quality control staff
or operations such as final inspection decrease. At the same
time, the NIST survey results showed a significant increase in
the share of R&D and capital investment outlays supporting
quality-related activities. Increases in quality-related
spending in these two budget categories were consistent with a
move towards Stage Three methods of prevention. Prevention would
entail increased emphasis on development and design of products
and processes for improved manufacturability and increased
reliability.
The NIST survey results also indicated a shift in the
management objectives that quality-related outlays were targeted
to support. Traditional management objectives, such as improving
product performance, showed relative declines. At the same time
a completely new objective of "education and training" surfaced.
(See Table 4.) These shifts, especially in favor of increased
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training and education, indicated how the increase in quality-
related outlays flowed toward a broad set of objectives in line
with those observed in Japanese firms.
Evolution of U.S. Quality Assurance Strategies
In moving towards adopting the comprehensive approach used
by the Japanese towards quality assurance, U.S. firms faced a
number of significant issues. These issues ranged from how they
organized their quality control organization and defined its
mission, to how they rewarded their mid-level line managers, to
how they trained their line operating personnel, and, most
importantly, to how they dealt with outside suppliers. Each one
required special attention; otherwise, the overall drive toward
improved quality would not succeed. For instance, most firms had
their quality control (QC) group organized along classic lines.
The QC group was a stand-alone organization responsible for
outgoing quality through final test and qualification. This form
of organization reinforced a Stage One approach to quality and
minimized the role of manufacturing and other operating
departments.
Closely related to the issue of organizational form were the
management priorities of mid-level operating managers. Their
priorities were significantly influenced by the criteria used in
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their periodic management reviews. Typically the criteria used
to grade the performance of these mid-level managers did not
explicitly identify quality as a important management objective.
Line personnel were also not integrated into the process of
quality improvement. In contrast to Japanese practices, U.S.
line operating personnel were not given clear responsibilities
that included quality assurance broadly defined in the Japanese
sense; neither was training of line personnel. Lastly, there was
also a problem with the treatment of outside vendors. Sharing of
sensitive data on new process recipes with outside vendors was
practically verboten -- exactly the opposite of the usual
protocol in Japan.
The process of reaching the Japanese standard of performance
mandated similar adjustments both in internal management
practices as well as changes to the external relationships.
Chances in Internal Organizational Practices
The requirements of meeting the challenge of attaining
Japanese style "total" quality assurance led to major
organization changes. These changes broadened the
responsibilities for quality assurance and emphasized
manufacturing as the centerpiece for quality. The nature of
these changes can be illustrated with four examples: (1) how the
20
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Quality Control (QC) organization was reorganized and its mission
redefined; (2) the diffusion of QC-related responsibilities
firmwide; (3) changes in line operator training; and (4) the
institutionalization of greater discipline in manufacturing and
related management decision-making. The first three examples
relate to how responsibilities for quality assurance were
broadened.
Organizational Structure. The traditional QC organization
had typically been responsible for carrying out inspection and
monitoring outgoing quality levels. As U.S. quality assurance
philosophy moved more towards Stage Three Prevention in the mid-
to late-1980s, the QC organization was decreased in size and its
mission statement revised. At AMD, for example, in the late
1980s:
...dependence on a classic quality organization decreased.
The job responsibility shifted to operations while the
quality organization became responsible for auditing, acting
a facilitator with a link to the customer, and essentially
measuring the effectiveness of the organization in meeting
the corporate emphasis on quality.26
Redefining Line Managers Goals. In conjunction with the
changed focus of the QC organization and its mission,
responsibilities for quality assurance diffused broadly through
all parts and across all levels of the organization, aligning
U.S. management's decision-making culture more closely with that
21
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of the Japanese. Everyone in the company would participate in
achieving improved quality. Line manager's performance bonus
scoring systems were altered to include an explicit quality
assurance element. For example, at Harris Semiconductor:
Quality is [now] given a definitive weight for line people
in terms of incentives and bonuses... Something like 10 to
20 percent of a bonus may be dedicated as a reward for
quality, for effective implementation and use of SPC.2 7
Increased Investment in Operator Training. The installation
of SPC practices necessitated increased investments in operator
training. According to the NIST survey, by the late 1980s about
15 percent of the surveyed companies' quality-related investments
flowed into this area -- a substantial increase since 1980. (See
Table 4.) Despite the increased training for operators, there
were major differences between the U.S. and Japan. While the
increased operator training sought to mirror the investment of
Japanese firms in this area, even today U.S. firms do not match
up well against their Japanese competitors. For instance, many
U.S. firms stopped far short of defining the job descriptions for
line operators as broadly as Japanese firms. Further, American
firms typically recruit personnel to work on their fabrication
lines who have a higher level of educational attainment than
those in Japan performing equivalent jobs. These differences
exist because U.S. firms confront a far higher level of attrition
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in their operator work force and, at the same time, traditionally
have found it difficult to recruit high school graduates with
sufficient educational attainment needed to fill operator
positions. This area has been and continues to be a weak point
relative to Japanese firms.
Discipline in the Organization U.S. managers who became
familiar with Japanese manufacturing practices in the early 1980s
recognized the greater degree of organizational discipline.
Greater discipline meant, for example, tighter control over
process specifications and closer coupling between designer
engineers and process engineers to ensure that a product's design
optimized a production line's performance. Thus, greater
discipline was essential to achieving long-run improvements in
quality assurance.
U.S. firms with manufacturing operations in Japan, such as
TI and Motorola, were the first to fully appreciate the
importance of instilling Japanese-style organizational discipline
in how they evolved manufacturing process and operating
conditions. The lessons of greater discipline were not always
easy ones to learn. In one case TI transferred the manufacturing
knowhow for a leading edge memory product from its production
line located at Miho, Japan to a line at Dallas, Texas. The
Dallas line was supposed to be an exact duplicate of the Miho
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line. The manager of the U.S. line, however, decided to "tweak"
the Miho process -- a decision that ulimately cost months in
delays as unforeseen problems arose in getting process conditions
stabilized. The U.S. manager was finally removed and replaced by
a TI-Japan manager who quickly stablized the line by restoring
the original process conditions.
For other U.S. firms, such as Intel, AMD, and National, who
did not have the same type of window on Japanese manufacturing
practices, the learning process took place through other
channels. Some learning developed out of relationships with
Japanese joint venture partners, but an equally significant means
came from participation in a manufacturing consortium called
SEMATECH established by fourteen U.S. semiconductor firms. Upon
its inception in 1988, SEMATECH began to play an important role
in encouraging U.S. firms to impose greater discipline in their
manufacturing operations. For example, based on its
participation in SEMATECH, National Semiconductor decided to
centralize all process development activities into a single
facility. All of the manufacturing processes run at National's
different manufacturing plants gradually were required to conform
to process specifications established by the central development
group. No modifications by the engineers at the manufacturing
lines were permitted without its approval.
24
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Achieving greater discipline required that U.S. managers
change their management philosophy to "force teamwork and not
allow independent actions."28 An Intel manager explained the
role of greater organizational discipline in quality assurance at
Intel as follows:
There's [a need for] tight control over operations -- no
'tweaking' of the process steps is permitted.... If you don't
approach improvements systematically, you don't know why
you're getting improvements....There is a greater degree of
inter-relationships among different elements [of the
manufacturing process] -- the same processes are used across
different product lines. Communication is enhanced and
simplified by the discipline over the organization. It does
not require more overhead, rather less. For example, before
[we] had planners in each operating group (with the product
group, the fab, the test group, and the assembly operation).
Now [we] have centralized the planning operation and this
has stabilized the operating plan. Overhead has been
reduced by centralizing the functions -- every group gets
some part of the responsibility for balancing the overall
plan.... Job descriptions were expanded as part of the
decentralizing of the responsibilities.29
A senior executive at Harris Semiconductor summed up the
implications of greater discipline for the U.S. industry as
follows:
Ten years ago...the issue was who could hire the best and
the brightest product design engineer. An answer does not
lie [today] in individual contribution to a company or
relying on expertise in one area. Rather, the team/systems
approach wins in today's integrated circuit] house.30
An executive at TI, describing the change in their quality
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assurance philosophy in the 1980s, provides a good summary of the
changes that were instituted at the U.S. semiconductor firms who
led the way in closing the quality gap:
A shift in TI's definition of quality initially took place
in 1980-1981. [We] used to look at quality in terms of PPM
product defects. However, [our] definition of quality
radically evolved into one of total quality performance and
customer defined quality (which includes every part of the
interface .... Things such as the following are included in
the concept of quality: management decisions, customer
interface, vendor interface, and total quality control.
Quality is not a segmented function for most employees, but
an integral part of virtually everyone's performance
criteria.31
Changes in External Relationships
No aspect of the Japanese quality-driven strategy was more
difficult for U.S. semiconductor firms to emulate than the
Japanese style of having extremely close relationships with
external vendors. While U.S. firms could seek their own way of
adapting Japanese manufacturing quality objectives into their own
organizations, the process of changing their external
relationships was far more difficult. At first, U.S. firms
sought to instill into their vendors a common set of quality
objectives together with a harmonization of practices by
winnowing the number of suppliers down to a select few designated
as "best in breed." Intel, for instance, explained the idea:
26
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"We have no commodities with more than three suppliers; more
frequently we have only two suppliers. Sometimes we'll go
with a single supplier, but if we do that, we make sure it's
a supplier with dual factories or with dual tooling.
[Simultaneously,]...there has been an increase in resources
in the procurement process, and a larger portion of
management dedicated to quality of incoming material. This
is how procurement management is evaluated. 32
But working with a more limited set of suppliers, with
greater management attention still fell short of the degree of
integration that Japanese firms took to be the norm. The
solution to how to achieve the required degree of close coupling
in external relationships ultimately fell to SEMATECH.
SEMATECH's original mission was to address the need to
develop leading edge process technologies for U.S. firms. But a
by-product of SEMATECH's creation was to provide a means of
breaking down the barriers to developing tighter, almost
Japanese-style, customer-vendor relationships.33 For example,
while Japanese device firms had for years routinely shared
details on their most advanced processes with key equipment and
materials vendors, such a degree of sharing was a rare exception
in the U.S.34 SEMATECH began to change that. First, SEMATECH
provided a vehicle for technology exchange with the vendor base
by presenting information on the broad technical roadmaps the
major device firms were pursuing. Further, SEMATECH indirectly
encouraged the sharing of detailed process information. Today,
details on future processes are more frequently shared so that
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vendors can participate in the specification of future process
requirements.
SEMATECH has been such an effective instrument in improving
the development of U.S. technology roadmaps that Japanese
semiconductor executives are now closely studying SEMATECH's
operating procedures and are considering whether they should
create a similar entity in Japan.35
Is The Quality War Over?
The payoff from the U.S. industry's increased emphasis on
quality assurance investments began to manifest itself by the
mid-1980's. The average rate of product defects fell from 760
PPM in the early 1980s to less than 400 PPM by 1986. The decline
in the defect rate continued steadily. By 1990, the rate fell
below 100 PPM, see Figure 1, a rate in line with that being
achieved by the best Japanese producers.36
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While it would be an overstatement to claim victory in the
quality war for all U.S. semiconductor producers, the efforts of
the leading edge companies clearly paid off. No longer can it be
claimed that, from a quality standpoint, the leading firms are
only located in Japan. In fact, by 1989, H-P, who started the
drive to improve quality in the U.S. semiconductor industry in
the early 1980s, noted that the best U.S. firms were equaling the
level of the best Japanese firms. 37 Even Japanese observers seem
to acknowledge this.3 8
Undoubtedly the improvement in U.S. quality helped lay the
foundation for the striking recovery in the global market share
held by U.S. firms.
What lessons should be derived from all this? First,
superior quality is not a Japanese cultural mandate. U.S. firms,
too, can successfully implement a total quality philosophy.
Second, in the wake of the U.S. semiconductor industry's
effort to follow Japanese practices there has been a blurring of
what used to be sharp distinctions between the general management
and organizational practices in the two countries. Internally,
the Japanese have adopted practices that put a heavy emphasis on
maintenance, training, and selective automation to support their
quality assurance goals. Leading edge American firms have
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followed this general approach.
However, the degree of tight coupling between the Japanese
semiconductor producers and their vendors is something American
firms are still working to create. SEMATECH proved to be a novel
new approach to facilitating change in the traditional form of
vendor-customer interaction in the U.S. Traditional Japanese
business practices facilitate an extremely close set of working
relationships among different firms, and it is unlikely that
American firms will ever totally emulate Japanese practices in
this area. But increased Japanese interest in the role that
SEMATECH plays in establishing common technical roadmaps
throughout the industry suggests that SEMATECH's leverage may be
substantial. The lesson here would seem to be that the West need
not emulate all aspects of Japanese organizational and management
practices in order to be competitive.
For other U.S. industries facing intense international
competition the lessons to be learned from the experience of the
U.S. semiconductor industry are several. Study and learn from
your competitors, but copy smart. When Western management
practices inhibit outright copying, search for a new means to
effect similar outcomes. Sometime the results can even be
superior. Blind copying of Japanese practices is not needed to
be successful. Rather, thoughtful adaptation is essential if
30
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broad Japanese principles are to be inserted into practice in the
U.S. with real weight.
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TABLE 1
The Four Stages In The Evolution
Quality Control Practices In The U.S. Semiconductor Industry
Stage 1 Inspections and Verification This philosophy toward
quality assurance permeated the U.S. semiconductor industry in
the 1960s when the U.S. military market was the single largest
market in the world for ICs. Strongly influenced by the U.S.
Department of Defense procurement philosophy of inspection and
verification inserted into the industry in the 1960s, firms
relying upon this approach would "inspect everything." To
verify life cycle reliability, stress tests and sometimes
destructive testing were the means used to verify conformance
to military specifications (Mil-Specs).
Stage 2 Appraisal The "heavy on inspection" philosophy
evolved toward an appraisal system that emphasized
measurement, evaluation, and auditing of final product
quality, as well as insuring that purchased components and
materials conformed with quality standards and performance
requirements.
Stage 3 Prevention A more robust approach to quality
assurance than appraisal that involves major changes in
management philosophy, such as designing quality into the
product, application of Statistical Process Control (SPC)
techniques to manufacturing operations, and shifting the
responsibilities for quality assurance into the operating
organizations. Conventional quality assurance organizations
decrease in size and importance in firms applying this
approach.
Stace 4 Total Ouality Manaqement (TOM) TQM is an approach to
quality assurance that seeks to completely emulate the
Japanese management philosophy of quality assurance. It
incorporates all of the elements of prevention, but goes on to
a broader concept. Quality assurance becomes the
responsibility of all levels of management and employees,
while relationships with vendors and customers are aligned to
reflect and support the total quality philosophy.
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Table 2
Estimated Percentage of Total Company Outlays
Directly or Indirectly Allocated
Towards Achieving Quality
(Percent)
Average, 1980-1985 1990
10-20 20-35
Source: NIST survey of 11 U.S. semiconductor firms.
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Table 3
Percent of Company Outlays Related to Quality
Within Major Budget Categories
(Range of Percentages Reported)
Budget Average 1990
Category 1980-1985
Operations 25-70 10-25
Overhead 20-50 10-60
R&D 0-5 5-40
Capital 0-10 10-60
Source: NIST survey of 11 U.S. semiconductor firms.
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1.This article is based in part on three earlier studies by the
author. The first, prepared for the National Institute of
Standards and Technology, "U.S. Investment Strategies for Quality
Assurance," the second, "The Effectiveness of the Japanese R&D
Cycle: Engineering and Technology Transfer in Japan's
Semiconductor Industry," and the third, "Advanced Equipment
Development in Japan's Semiconductor Equipment Industry"; the
last two studies were co-authored with Jeffrey Frey for the
Semiconductor Research Corporation. Views expressed in this
article are solely those of the author.
2.Source: DATAQUEST, a semiconductor industry market research
firm.
3.There are a number of benchmarks that can be used in the
semiconductor industry to measure quality, such as the yield of
good parts in production or the turn around time in delivery, but
the rate or percent of defective parts actually shipped is
recognized in both Japan and the U.S. as the best overall
Table 4
Allocation of Company Quality-Related
Outlays By
Management Objective
(Percent)
Management Average 1990
Objective 1980-1985
Improving Product 45 30
Performance
Reducing Attribute 15 25
Variability
Increasing Product 5 20
Reliability
Improving 35 10
Manufacturability
(Improved materials and
processes)
Other N/R 15
(Education/Training)
Total 100 100
Source: Average response from NIST survey of 11
U.S. semiconductor firms.
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measure. There are several reasons to prefer the PPM measure
over other measures. First, yields, the percent of good product
produced, varies from product to product and company to company
for reasons completely unrelated to quality. For example, if one
company produces devices of a very simple design with older
design rules, its yields would tend to be higher than those of
another firm producing newer, more complex devices with
aggressive design rules. Second, company-specific data on actual
yields achieved or turn around times are a closely held secret
making overall comparisons difficult to make between Japanese and
U.S. firms.
4.PPM data can be reported either for outgoing quality or for
incoming quality, that is, at the customer level. The PPM data
presented here is for outgoing quality, except were noted.
5.Data on incoming PPM levels supplied to the author by Hewlett
Packard.
6.Data on U.S. defect density Semiconductor Industry Association
Quarterly Quality Report survey for defect density for all MOS
devices. Data on Japanese PPM taken from translation of Nikkei
Electronics article, "User, Manufacturer Cooperation In Quality
Assurance," June, 1988, which states: "In the case of 256K DRAM
memories, the average failure rate is about 100 PPM." Another
Nikkei Electronics article in the same month reported the
acceptable range for defects to about 100 to 200 PPM.
7.At that time, the U.S. semiconductor customer base consisted of
three tiers. The first tier, mainly the main frame computer and
high-end business equipment makers, were the most quality
conscience. The Japanese companies concentrated on qualifying
their products with these firms in order to establish their
position as high-quality producers.
8.Fujikawa, et al., "Evaluation on the Quality of Semiconductors
from the Users' Point of View,", Quality Engineering Department,
Engineering Division, Matsushita Communications Industrial Co.,
Ltd, June, 1982; p. 14.
9."Total Preventative Maintenance," Translation of paper prepared
by NEC, Yamagata facility management, presented at Super LSI
Ultraclean Symposium, No. 6, Tokyo, Japan, June 1988.
10."Current Status and Problems of IC Production Facilities,"
Translation of paper presented by Fujitsu, author unknown, at
Super LSI Ultraclean Symposium, Tokyo, Japan, June 1988.
11.H. Horikiri, "Current Status and Problems of Production
Systems," Translation of paper, LSI Production Headquarters, NEC,
undated.
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12.Interview with K. Kurokawa, Fujitsu.
13.Based on author's interviews with managers in Japan and the
U.S.
14."Total Preventative Maintenance."
15.An example of the U.S. views on the benefits of automation can
be found in the statement of M. Shopbell, AMD, "Equipment
Automation," Information Services Seminar, Semiconductor
Equipment and Materials International, 1985, p. 239.
16.H. Horikiri, p. 8.
17.Jim Freedman of IBM and Robert Learch of Monsanto conducted an
informal study of this feedback system in Japan and concluded
that it was far more thorough and intensive than any comparable
degree of interaction among U.S. firms.
18.The author together with Professor Jeff Frey extensively
studied the relationship between Japanese device and equipment
firms.
19.Fujikawa, p.2.
20.Based on interviews conducted by the author in Japan with
equipment vendors and semiconductor firms. Several equipment
firms noted that they are never pressed to the same extent to
supply information by American firms nor asked to work with the
American firm to assess new process developments.
21.J. Freedman and R. Lerch, "Analysis of Specification
Requirements of U.S. and Japan Semiconductor Fabricators,"
unpublished paper prepared for the Semiconductor Industry
Association of Japan, 1986.
22.DATAQUEST global market data for DRAMs.
23. DATAQUEST.
24.Since the 1950s, there had been a number of groups established
in Japan such as the Japan Productivity Center whose mission
included promoting quality assurance improvement. These groups
fostered a broad understanding among Japanese managers of the
importance of quality in determining overall competitiveness.
25.Among the firms covered by the NIST survey were: TI; AMD;
Intel; Harris Semiconductor; LSI Logic; National Semiconductor;
and VLSI.
26.Author's interview with Wayne Cantu, AMD.
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27.Author's interview with Sharon Sines, Vice President Quality
Assurance, Harris Semiconductor.
28.Author's interview with Sharon Sines.
29.Author's interview with Steve Sillyman, Intel.
30.Author's interview with Sharon Sines.
31.Author's interview.
32.Author's interview with Jim Watson.
33.Though not in the original strategic plan for SEMATECH, the
SEMATECH mission quickly became expanded to encompass an effort
to sustain the viability of U.S. semiconductor equipment and
materials suppliers. An adjunct association called SEMI/SEMATECH
was established in 1988 to liaison with the equipment and
materials industry. This organization played an important role
in subsequent years in developing stronger ties between device
firms and their vendors.
34.Author's interviews with U.S. and Japanese managers in the
semiconductor industry.
35.Author's interviews with Japanese semiconductor executives,
1992.
36.Nikkei Electronics, June, 1988.
37.The quality director at H-P was quoted in 1989 to have stated:
"On the one hand, Walter [quality director at H-P] said he is
encouraged by how many U.S. companies have improved the quality
of their products, but he is depressed to see so many that have
not. He said the best U.S. chip-makers are now on a par with the
best of the Japanese, but, on average, quality in the United
States still is not as high as in Japan." Electronic Buyers'
News, Sept. 4, 1989, p. 44.
38."LSI quality varies according to the manufacturer and the type
of LSI. LSI quality also differs according to the manufacturing
plant, even in the case of the same manufacturer and type of
LSI...Even LSI manufacturers determine LSI quality according to
the users' requirements. In other words, LSI quality varies
according to the manufacturer." Nikkei Electronics, June, 1988.
· _ I ___
__________1___1______ 1_1_
